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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Dale Charles appeals from his convictions for murder in 
the first degree and for possession of a knife with intent to use 
it unlawfully.  He raises three challenges to his convictions. 
First, Charles argues that he did not voluntarily and 
intelligently waive his right to counsel when the district court, 
after a hearing, granted Charles' request to represent himself at 
trial.  Second, Charles asserts that the district court should 
have dismissed the information against him because the government 
conceded during plea negotiations that Charles was insane when 
the acts in question occurred.  Third, Charles claims that there 
was insufficient evidence of deliberation and premeditation.  We 
will affirm. 
 
I. 
 In May 1989, Charles stabbed Dale Francois to death in 
an alley on the Island of St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands. 
Francois was unarmed.  Apparently, when Francois entered the 
alley, Charles rushed Francois without provocation and stabbed 
him several times.  The government of the Virgin Islands filed an 
information that charged Charles with first degree murder under 
14 V.I.C. § 922(a)(1) and with possession of a knife with intent 
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to use it unlawfully against Francois during the commission of a 
crime of violence under 14 V.I.C. § 2251(a)(2). 
 In May 1990, after the defense persuaded the district 
court to allow Charles to withdraw a guilty plea, a defense 
expert, Arthur Stillman, M.D., undertook a psychiatric evaluation 
of Charles.  Dr. Stillman concluded that "it seems doubtful that 
[Charles] could adequately assist his attorney in the preparation 
and presentation of his defenses [and i]t is quite clear that he 
cannot differentiate reality from fantasy. . . ."  (App. at 51-
52.)  In addition, regarding Charles' state of mind when he 
stabbed Francois, Stillman opined that Charles "was suffering 
from a psychotic paranoid state and is considered to have been 
insane at that time."  (App. at 52.)  In November 1990, Michael 
W. Morrison, Ph.D., a court appointed expert, agreed: 
Mr. Charles is suffering from a mental 
illness that renders him unable to understand 
the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings against him and unable to assist 
properly in his defense. . . .  Mr. Charles 
was severely mentally ill on [the day of the 
offense] and his use of a dangerous weapon to 
commit murder that day was a consequence of 
his mental illness. 
(App. at 65-66.)1 
 In March 1991, the district court found Charles 
mentally incompetent to stand trial.  By December 1992, Bruce 
Burger, M.D., of the Federal Bureau of Prisons found that 
Charles' condition had stabilized and that Charles was competent 
                     
1
  Under Virgin Islands law, "[a]ll persons are capable of 
committing crimes and offenses except . . . persons who are 
mentally ill and who committed the act charged against them in 
consequence of such mental illness . . . ."  14 V.I.C. § 14(4). 
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to stand trial.  In March 1994, Leighman Lu, M.D., a court 
appointed expert, and in June 1994, Michael Chiappetta, Psy. D., 
a defense expert, agreed that Charles was competent to stand 
trial.  Lu also found that Charles was not suffering from any 
disorder at the time of the offense.  Dr. Burger reevaluated 
Charles in June 1994, and once again found Charles competent to 
stand trial.  After a hearing on September 26, 1994, the district 
court found Charles competent to stand trial.  Jury selection was 
completed that afternoon and the trial began the next day.  
 Apparently, at some point before the September 26 
hearing, the prosecution and the defense had reached an 
agreement.  Both parties would consent to a bench trial and would 
stipulate to all of the facts including the findings of Dr. 
Morrison, namely that Charles' actions were the result of his 
mental illness.  Presumably, what the parties had in mind was a 
finding by the district court of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, followed by automatic commitment to a psychiatric 
institution under 5 V.I.C. § 3637.  Had the government dropped 
the charges without the stipulation, Charles could have been 
involuntarily committed only in a proceeding under the general 
civil commitment statute.  That statute requires clear and 
convincing proof that the individual is a danger to society, and 
that treatment is likely to be beneficial.  19 V.I.C. § 723.  
 The agreement fell apart, however, when Charles decided 
that he did not want to raise the defense of insanity.  Rather, 
he decided to claim self defense and demand a jury trial.  The 
prosecution, which had no burden to produce evidence regarding 
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Charles' sanity at the time of the offense until Charles first 
presented some evidence of insanity, see Government of Virgin 
Islands v. Webbe, 821 F.2d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 1987), decided to 
proceed to trial.  Charles' attorney, Stephen Brusch, convinced 
that he could not, on behalf of Charles, agree to the stipulation 
of insanity or raise the defense of insanity at trial without 
Charles' consent, moved to dismiss the information on the ground 
that the prosecution had effectively conceded that Charles was 
insane at the time of the offense.  The district court concluded 
that Charles' mental state at the time of the offense was an 
issue for the jury and denied the motion. 
 At that point, Charles also decided that he no longer 
wanted Brusch to represent him.  He wanted to represent himself 
at trial.  Charles was convinced that Brusch was hostile to the 
idea of arguing self defense and Charles was concerned that 
Brusch, as an employee of the local government, had conflicting 
loyalties.  At the hearing on September 26, 1994, after finding 
Charles to be competent to stand trial and after an extensive 
colloquy with Charles, the district court determined that Charles 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.  The 
district court granted Charles' motion to proceed pro se and 
appointed Brusch as stand-by counsel to assist Charles.     
 Charles presented his case to the jury during a two day 
trial.  The jury convicted him on both counts and the district 
court sentenced him to life in prison without parole.  The 
district court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  We have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II. 
 First, Charles argues that he did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his right to counsel.  The Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the assistance of counsel to 
anyone accused of a serious criminal offense.  See Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Because a defendant who asks to represent herself is waiving the 
benefits associated with this important constitutional right, and 
because "courts [must] indulge in every reasonable presumption 
against waiver" of important constitutional rights, Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977), a court cannot grant such a 
request unless the record shows that the relinquishment is 
"knowing and intelligent[]."  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 835 (1975) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 
(1938)).  
  In James, this Court provided some details regarding 
the scope of the Faretta inquiry that a court should undertake in 
response to a defendant's request to proceed pro se.  First, the 
court must make an inquiry regarding the defendant's reasons for 
the request.  James, 934 F.2d at 470-71.  Second, the court 
should make sure that the defendant is aware of the dangers of 
self-representation.  Specifically, the court should make a 
thorough and penetrating inquiry to determine whether the 
defendant understands the nature of the charges, the range of 
possible punishment, potential defenses, technical problems that 
the defendant may encounter, and any other facts important to a 
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general understanding of the risks involved.  Id. at 471, 473. 
There is no rote speech that the court must recite.  Rather, the 
proper inquiry depends on the particular facts and circumstances 
of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of 
the accused.  Id. at 473-74.  
 In order for a waiver of the right to counsel to be 
valid, the court must first assure itself that the defendant is 
competent to waive the right.  Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 
2685 (1993).  The competency necessary to waive the right to 
counsel is identical to the competency necessary to stand trial. 
Id. at 2685-86.  The defendant must be able to consult with 
counsel and must have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings.  United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 766 (3d 
Cir. 1977).  Since a competent defendant is entitled to make his 
or her own decision with respect to representation, it is 
irrelevant whether the defendant is capable of representing 
himself or herself effectively.  Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2687.   
 We decide de novo whether the record demonstrates a 
knowing and intelligent waiver.  United States v. Velasquez, 885 
F.2d 1076, 1085 (3d Cir. 1989).  However, regarding a colloquy 
between the defendant and the court, the issue of whether the 
defendant misunderstood what the court said, despite the 
defendant's unambiguous answers indicating comprehension, is a 
pure question of fact which depends primarily on the demeanor, 
conduct, and intonations of the defendant.  We review a finding 
on this underlying factual issue under a clearly erroneous 
standard.  See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985).  We 
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review the district court's findings regarding the competency of 
the defendant for clear error.  United States v. Velasquez, 885 
F.2d 1076, 1089 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Charles concedes that the district court conducted a 
sufficient inquiry.  Indeed, the district court's inquiry was 
thorough and probing.  However, Charles argues that he was not 
competent to waive the right to counsel and that his answers 
demonstrate that he did not understand the trial court's 
admonitions. 
 
A.  Charles' Competency 
 At the outset of the hearing on September 26, the day 
before the trial began, the district court determined that 
Charles was competent to stand trial and thus to make all of the 
important decisions associated with trial.  That decision was not 
clearly erroneous.   
 The district court based its finding of competence on 
the testimony and conduct of Charles at the September 26, 1994 
hearing and on a July 11, 1994 report written by Dr. Burger.  Dr. 
Burger saw Charles on a regular basis during his prior 
hospitalization and after he was readmitted for study on June 14, 
1994.  Dr. Burger concluded that Charles was capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the charges against him and had 
the ability to consult meaningfully with his counsel.  Dr. 
Burger's report indicated that Charles "evidenced an excellent 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of court officers 
as well as his own obligations and rights in a court situation." 
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(App. at 145.)  He was alert and fully oriented at all times. His 
cognitive abilities were in the low average range for an adult.  
Charles suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and had 
experienced intermittent severe psychotic episodes in the past, 
but his schizophrenia was currently in remission.  Charles showed 
no symptoms of schizophrenia and was not taking medication.  When 
the district court asked each side whether it wished to contest 
the conclusions reached in Dr. Burger's report, neither Charles 
nor his counsel sought to do so. 
 We are mindful that Dr. Burger's report was two and one 
half months old when the September 26, 1994 hearing took place 
and that some of Charles' responses at the hearing were 
rambling.2  We cannot say, however, that Charles' responses as a 
                     
2
  For example: 
 
 THE COURT:  Now, why do you think you are more 
competent than counsel . . . ? 
 CHARLES:  Your Honor, you might think I'm 
incompetent, if I tell you that. 
 THE COURT:  Pardon? 
 CHARLES:  I said, for what I might say to you, 
right, you might consider me incompetent. 
 THE COURT:  I didn't say that.  I said, why do you 
think you are more competent than counsel. 
 CHARLES:  I said, my answer to you would maybe 
make you think that I am incompetent. 
 THE COURT:  Well, let me hear your answer. 
 CHARLES:  Well, your Honor, growing up, my family, 
and there was, you know, fightings and things like 
that, where people of Mr. Brusch's descendants -- once 
a fourteen year old child or a sixteen year old child 
fight with my mother's husband, and no one tried to 
assist us, call the police, do anything, which in they 
were also the ones removed the gun from the place. 
 So I don't, I don't know for sure what I am going 
through, what I am going through, and why Mr. Brusch is 
not in favor of me exposing all of these things that 
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whole were inconsistent with Dr. Burger's observations and 
opinions.  The district court observed Charles first-hand at the 
hearing the day before the trial began and was in the best 
position to observe Charles, evaluate his mental state, and 
determine whether a follow-up evaluation was necessary.  We 
decline to second guess the district court's determination. 
 
B.  Charles' Responses Concerning 
                    the Assistance of Counsel 
 Charles' responses to the district court's questions 
were sufficient to demonstrate that his waiver of the right to 
                                                                  
has happened here in The Islands, because of the 
government's inconcern [sic], unconcern, you know. 
 And I have been pushed to the point where now 
someone is hurt by me having to protect me, and all 
criminal activities, the Police Department might be 
saying I've been involved in, that I would be framed, 
and the witnesses would say I did things that I did not 
do.   
  * * * 
 THE COURT:  In other words, you don't want the 
stipulation [of insanity].  You want to go to trial. 
That's what you are telling me. 
 CHARLES:  I want the stipulation, too, but still I 
want to make them pay.  I mean, to anything to get out, 
if I don't out by winning, and I get out by going to 
North Carolina, I be in the United States, even if I 
have to live the rest of my life in prison, that's okay 
with me.  But I want them to punish, you know, because 
they are supposed uphold the law now, not favoring 
nobody.  Everything is the white man -- 
 
(App. at 232-33, 248-48a.) 
 
 Although rambling, when read in context, even these 
responses were not incoherent.  As Charles expressed throughout 
the hearing, he felt that the police and government had 
mistreated him and his family in the past, and he wanted to "make 
them pay" by exposing this at trial.  Charles wanted to tell his 
side of the story despite the risks:  "[E]ven if I have to spend 
the rest of my life in prison, that's okay with me."  (App. at 
248-48a.) 
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assistance of counsel was knowing and intelligent.  Considering 
Charles' history of mental illness and limited education, the 
district court appropriately conducted an inquiry that was 
especially thorough and probing. 
 First, the court made sure that Charles understood the 
purpose of the hearing: 
 THE COURT:  Now, I am going through a procedure 
here to determine whether or not you fully understand 
the consequences of your expressed desire to proceed 
with the representation of yourself -- 
  CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  -- and that you are doing that 
voluntarily and intelligently.  Do you understand that? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir, very intelligently. 
(App. at 227.) 
 Next, the court asked Charles why he was dissatisfied 
with his appointed counsel.  Charles made clear that he was 
concerned that his appointed counsel was hostile to the idea of 
arguing self defense and that he wanted the public to know that 
he was not insane:   
 CHARLES:  Your Honor, my dissatisfaction is based 
upon being in the United States and speaking with 
doctors and prison officials and other people that has 
heard the nature of the offense and why it was 
committed, and they are totally in disagreement with 
Mr. Brusch's way of handling it, that I cannot win. 
They are stating that based upon my defense, they don't 
see why any attorney would resist presenting it.  And 
that is what it is based upon. 
 Also, to the interest of the public, who I don't 
owe no explanation, but I still think I do, you know. I 
went to school here, and teachers and things like that, 
I have heard, "Well, Mr. Charles is charged with 
murder, and they think Mr. Charles is crazy and" --this 
and that.  I think I owe them an explanation to clear 
their mind of any doubt that I am anybody different to 
who they have known before. 
 * * * 
 CHARLES:  [My attorney] has never seen my side of 
the case. 
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 THE COURT:  Well, I understand that's what you're 
saying.  But apparently, from what I also understand 
you are saying, was that he, in the course of 
representing you, made the observation to you that the 
procedure you are willing to follow, in his opinion, 
could not be in your best interest.  Isn't that what 
you are telling me? 
 CHARLES:  Yes. . . .  It might be, it might hurt -
- it might hamper me, it might hurt me in the long run, 
but it's in the best of my interest, what I want to 
present. 
(App. at 227-29.)   
 Next the court made sure that Charles understood that 
he was not as competent as an attorney: 
 THE COURT:  Well, certainly, you realize that you 
are not as competent as a lawyer would be, insofar as 
the rules of procedure -- 
 CHARLES:  Yes. 
 THE COURT:  -- and in terms of meeting issues 
raised by the government.  Do you agree with that 
statement? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, but that's what I would like [Mr. 
Brusch] to sit there for. 
 THE COURT:  Pardon? 
 CHARLES:  Any issue that the government raises 
that I don't understand, that's what I'm going to have 
him there for.  He is going to work for me. 
 THE COURT:  In other words, you're the lawyer, but 
you are going to turn to him to assist you -- 
 CHARLES:  When I don't understand something. 
(App. at 231.) 
 Next the court established that Charles understood the 
government's burden of proof at trial: 
 THE COURT:  . . . It's the government's obligation 
and responsibility to prove you guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt and, therefore, you are not required 
to prove or disprove anything.  Do you understand that? 
 CHARLES:  Yes I understand that.  I think I do. 
(App. at 234.) 
 Next the court made sure that Charles understood the 
nature of the charges against him and of his defense: 
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 THE COURT:  All right.  Now, do you understand the 
nature of the charges against you? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  What are you charged with? 
  CHARLES:  First degree murder. 
 THE COURT:  Of whom? 
 CHARLES:  Mr. Dale Francois. 
 THE COURT:  And your defense to that is? 
 CHARLES:  My actions was done in self-defense. 
 THE COURT:  All right.  And you understand what 
self-defense means? 
 CHARLES:  Yes.  Preservation comes first. 
 THE COURT:  Pardon? 
 CHARLES:  Preservation, self-preservation comes 
first. 
 THE COURT:  All right.  Now, have you done any 
reading of the law in this area? 
 CHARLES:  What I have been with paralegals in the 
United States and I have learned a little bit, but I 
haven't done much reading about it. 
 THE COURT:  But you have discussed the case with 
them? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  Have you read any legal decisions or 
any cases on the subject? 
 CHARLES:  Well, not really.  A little bit of 
investigation here and there, that, you know, it was 
pertinent in presenting my case.  But I don't even 
think I have to go through those books to win this 
case. 
(App. at 234-35.) 
 Next the court made sure that Charles was aware of the 
possibility of pleading insanity: 
 THE COURT:  Now, you recognize, too, that Mr. 
Brusch has talked with you with respect to asserting an 
insanity or a mental illness defense? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  And you have rejected that? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  And you also understand, too, that 
there have been discussions, as you heard in the 
argument earlier today, that would -- could have 
brought about an agreement or a stipulation to present 
the matter to the Court for findings? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  And those are not acceptable, that is 
not acceptable to you; is that correct? 
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 CHARLES:  Not on the grounds they are presenting 
them with. 
 THE COURT:  The only thing that you would accept 
would be a dismissal of the case with prejudice? 
 CHARLES:  Yes sir. 
(App. at 238-39.) 
 Next the court made sure that Charles understood that 
he would have to conduct the case in conformity with the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
and that he understood the court's role regarding evidentiary 
issues:   
 THE COURT:  . . . You also realize that you are 
going to have to conduct your defense in the course of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure? 
Do you understand that? 
 CHARLES:  Well, I really know about that part. 
 THE COURT:  Well, you are going to have to do 
that. 
 CHARLES:  Well, being that you are the judge, you 
know -- 
 THE COURT:  Don't turn the tables on me.  I'm just 
telling you. 
 CHARLES:  All right.  I -- 
 THE COURT:  These are your responsibilities.  I'll 
take care of my responsibilities. 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  You have to assume your 
responsibilities.  I want to make you aware of them. 
 CHARLES:  The only thing I don't -- I am aware of 
what you are saying, but what I am saying is, you know, 
what might be inadmissible to the prosecution, right, 
might be pertinent to my defense.  So then, you would 
be the one would be left with the decision there. 
 THE COURT:  No, I will only rule, if the 
government goes ahead and enters certain evidence, if 
there is an objection to it, I will make a ruling. 
 CHARLES:  All right. 
 THE COURT:  If there is no objection, I will not 
make a ruling. 
 CHARLES:  All right, sir. 
(App. at 239-40.) 
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 Next, in a telling colloquy, Charles demonstrated that 
he understood that he lacked the knowledge of an attorney and 
that he was aware that this might hurt his case.  However, he was 
willing to take that risk:  
 THE COURT:  Now, in order to make an objection, 
you certainly have to have some understanding of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Now, you may be 
hampered in presenting your best defense by your lack 
of knowledge of the law, and certainly the 
effectiveness of your defense may well be diminished by 
your dual role as a lawyer and the accused.  Do you 
understand that? 
 CHARLES:  Yes.  That's the chance I going to have 
to take.  Those are the chances. 
  * * *  
 THE COURT:  All right.  So that you are well aware 
of all these problems, when you tell the Court that you 
want to proceed and conduct your own defense. 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  And you full understand the problems 
that will arise? 
 CHARLES:  No, sir. 
 THE COURT:  You don't understand the problems? 
 CHARLES:  All the problems, fully understand?  Not 
fully, but -- 
 THE COURT:  Well -- go ahead. 
 CHARLES:  -- basically, I do understand the 
proceedings.  But I cannot understand fully of thinks 
[sic] that I know nothing about.  
 THE COURT:  Well, I certainly tell you, sir, that 
you are better off having counsel represent you fully. 
But you seem to be intent on representing yourself; is 
that correct? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  And that Mr. Brusch's only 
position will be that of standby counsel -- 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  -- is that correct? 
 CHARLES:  Due to the fact that he does not want to 
present the defense that I want to present. 
(App. at 240-43.)  When Charles explained that he did not fully 
understand all of the problems that could arise at trial, he was 
not, as Charles argues, demonstrating a lack of understanding of 
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the risks of representing himself.  On the contrary, his 
explanation showed a lucid understanding of the fact that he was 
not an attorney and could not anticipate every single problem 
that could arise.  Faretta does not require a defendant to be 
able to anticipate the details of every single problem that self-
representation could cause.  Were this the standard, it would all 
but preclude anyone without a law degree from waiving the right 
to counsel.  
 Finally, the court made sure that Charles understood 
the penalty if he were convicted: 
 THE COURT:  All, right.  Now, you recognize, too, 
do you not, that the penalty here is, if the jury does 
find you guilty of first degree murder, the Court has 
no choice, no leeway, the Court is compelled to 
sentence you to life in prison without parole?  Do you 
understand that? 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir.  And I hope that the Court 
will also send me to an American prison, where I can 
further my education, get out of St. Thomas, due to the 
fact that I can't trust no one here, not even to 
represent me in court. 
 THE COURT:  Well, I can't do that, because in 
sentences here, if you are found guilty, you will be 
sentenced to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, 
for whatever sentence is determined.  It is up to the 
Bureau of Corrections to determine what it wants to to 
[sic] in terms of where you will serve your sentence. I 
don't control that. 
 CHARLES:  I am a United States citizen, not a 
Virgin Islander. 
 THE COURT:  It doesn't make any difference.  You 
could be in Yugoslavia and found guilty of murder 
there, if you were so found, you would be sent to 
prison under the laws of Yugoslavia. 
 CHARLES:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  Just as you are here, you are sent to 
a prison under the laws of the Government of the Virgin 
Islands. 
(App. at 244-45.) 
17 
 Charles' responses indicate that Charles made his 
decision to represent himself with his eyes wide open.  Despite, 
a few rambling answers, Charles unambiguously indicated that he 
understood the risks of self-representation as well as we could 
expect of him.  He was aware that his lack of legal knowledge 
could hurt his case.  He was aware that if convicted he would be 
sentenced to life in prison.  Yet, he wanted to tell his side of 
the story.  He believed that Mr. Brusch would not because Mr. 
Brusch wanted to argue insanity.   
 The district court believed that Charles comprehended 
what he was being told.  It observed Charles first-hand and was 
in a far better position than we to evaluate his answers, 
including the ones in which he rambled.  Its evaluation was not 
clearly erroneous.  Even from our vantage point, however, given 
the questions and answers we have quoted above, we believe one 
could not conclude that Charles failed to understand unless one 
were prepared to conclude that he was incapable of understanding. 
As we have indicated, however, the district court credited Dr. 
Burger's opinion that Charles was able to understand the 
proceedings against him and that finding was not clearly 
erroneous. 
C.  Knowing and Intelligent Waiver 
 We accordingly accept the district court's factual 
findings that Charles was competent to stand trial and that he 
understood the information conveyed to him by the court.  Based 
on those findings and independent review of the record, we 
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conclude that Charles' waiver of his right to counsel was knowing 
and intelligent. 
 
 III. 
 Next, Charles argues that we should reverse the 
conviction and dismiss the information against him because the 
government conceded that he was insane at the time of the 
offense.  As we understand Charles' argument, with the exception 
of the issue of premeditation which we address below, Charles 
acknowledges that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
return a verdict of guilty.  Nonetheless, in light of the 
government's alleged concession, Charles asks us to set aside the 
government's inherently discretionary decision to continue with 
the prosecution.   
 "In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute . . . generally 
rests in his discretion."  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
364 (1978).  Only in rare cases can a court interfere with the 
government's decision to prosecute.  For example, where a 
decision to prosecute is based on a defendant's race, religion, 
or decision to exercise a constitutional right, the courts must 
intercede.  See e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) 
(reversing a conviction due to retaliatory prosecution); United 
States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (setting 
out the elements of a claim of discriminatory prosecution).  
19 
 There is no claim of discriminatory or retaliatory 
prosecution here, and we see nothing else that would warrant our 
intervention.  While Charles claims that the government conceded 
that he was insane at the time of the offense, this 
mischaracterizes the record.  It is true that at one point during 
negotiations, the government was prepared to stipulate to Dr. 
Morrison's conclusion that Charles was insane at the time of the 
offense.  However, this stipulation was conditioned on Charles 
consenting to a bench trial and raising the insanity defense, 
thus exposing himself to a commitment under 5 V.I.C. § 3637. 
Because Charles refused to consent to the agreement, the 
government was not bound by the proposed stipulation.  
 Essentially what Charles is asking us to do is to 
prevent the government from prosecuting him because the 
prosecuting attorney may have subjectively believed that he was 
innocent by reason of insanity.  Charles cites no authority, 
however, for the proposition that an otherwise valid criminal 
conviction may be overturned based on the prosecuting attorney's 
subjective belief regarding the guilt of the accused.  Our own 
search has revealed none, and we decline to endorse that novel 
proposition.3 
 
IV. 
                     
3
  It is, of course, not clear that the prosecuting attorney had 
an affirmative belief that Charles was insane at the time of the 
crime.  She may well have believed that this was a litigable 
issue that might be lost and that, given the fact that the 
stipulation would result in Charles' commitment, the government's 
resources were better invested elsewhere. 
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 Finally, Charles asserts that there was insufficient 
evidence for the jury to conclude that he committed a deliberate 
and premeditated killing.  We review a claim of insufficiency of 
the evidence under a substantial evidence standard.  We determine 
whether there is substantial evidence that, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational 
trier of fact to convict.  United States v. Aguilar, 843 F.2d 
155, 157 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988). 
 Section 992 of Title 14 of the Virgin Islands Code 
distinguishes between first and second degree murder in the 
following manner: "All murder which . . . is perpetrated by means 
of poison, lying in wait, torture or by any other kind of 
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing . . . is murder in 
the first degree. . . .  All other kinds of murder are murder in 
the second degree."  As this court explained in Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Roldan, 612 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1979), a 
brief moment of deliberation can suffice: 
To premeditate a killing is to conceive the design or 
plan to kill. . . .  A deliberate killing is one which 
has been planned and reflected upon by the accused and 
is committed in a cool state of the blood, not in 
sudden passion engendered by just cause of provocation. 
. . .  It is not required, however, that the accused 
shall have brooded over his plan to kill or entertained 
it for any considerable period of time.  Although the 
mental processes involved must take place prior to the 
killing, a brief moment of thought may be sufficient to 
form a fixed, deliberate design to kill. . . . 
In addition, as a practical matter, premeditation can generally 
be proved only by circumstantial evidence:   
[S]ince [the defendant's mental processes] are wholly 
subjective it is seldom possible to prove them 
directly.  If premeditation is found it must ordinarily 
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be inferred from the objective facts.  Every sane man 
is presumed to intend all the natural and probable 
consequences flowing from his deliberate acts. . . .  
Accordingly, if one voluntarily does an act, the direct 
and natural tendency of which is to destroy another's 
life, it may fairly be inferred, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, that the destruction of that 
other's life was intended. 
Id.    
 In this case, there was ample evidence from which the 
jury could have inferred deliberation and premeditation.  An 
eyewitness testified that (1) Charles was sitting in the alley 
when Francois entered it; (2) Charles rose and rushed at 
Francois, grabbed Francois by his dreadlocks, and stabbed him 
repeatedly with a knife; and (3) preceding the attack there was 
no provocation by the victim or conversation between the two. 
Charles admitted that Francois was unarmed.  The coroner's report 
indicated three stab wounds including a fatal stab wound to the 
chest.  There was no evidence suggesting that the attack was 
initiated in the heat of passion. 
 The fact that Charles rushed at Francois immediately 
after Francois entered the alley does not preclude a finding of 
deliberation and premeditation.  A brief moment of thought can be 
sufficient.  Based on the use of a knife and the absence of any 
provocation or display of emotion by Charles, the jury could 
reasonably infer that Charles, in this brief moment, formulated a 
deliberate intent to kill Francois.     
 
V. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 This difficult case presents us with a window through which to view the real
world effects of the Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), 
and it is not a pretty sight.  Charles' behavior at a hearing before the district court 
left little doubt that he was prone to paranoid delusions and was unstable.  However, 
because the Supreme Court has determined that the competency standard required to 
knowingly and voluntarily waive one's right to counsel is the same as that required for a 
defendant to stand trial and to represent him or herself, I am compelled to concur with 
the judgment of the majority.  I write separately to explain why I disagree with the 
reasoning we are bound by in this case. 
 At the heart of the Supreme Court's holding in Godinez is the conclusion that a 
defendant's competence to conduct his or her own defense is "not relevant" to a 
determination of whether such a person is competent to knowingly and intelligently waive 
his or her right to counsel.  The rationale supporting this conclusion presupposes a 
reality in which persons who may be marginally sane and barely competent to get through a 
waiver of counsel hearing are nonetheless capable of trying their own cases.  Justice 
Blackmun, in an insightful dissent, questioned the wisdom of the Godinez majority's 
conclusion regarding the irrelevance of a defendant's competence to defend him or herself:
It is obvious that a defendant who waives counsel must represent 
himself . . .  And a defendant who is utterly incapable of conducting 
his own defense cannot be considered "competent" to make such a 
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decision, any more that a person who chooses to leap out of a window 
in the belief that he can fly can be considered competent to make such 
a choice. 
Godinez, 125 L.Ed.2d at 343 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).   
 In this case, it is abundantly clear from the record that Charles was not 
competent to conduct his own defense.  This man has had a well documented history of 
mental illness.  Indeed, it appears that Charles' decision to waive counsel, reject a 
possibly valid defense and proceed on his own may itself have been the product of mental 
illness.  In November 1990, a court appointed expert found Charles "unable to understand 
the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and unable to assist properly 
in his defense . . . "  App. at 65-66.  He remained hospitalized, under observation, and 
continued to receive treatment.  Four years later, two experts separately concluded that 
Charles was mentally competent to stand trial. One expert concluded that Charles suffered 
from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, but was in remission.  This expert also determined 
that Charles showed no signs of schizophrenia and was not taking medication.  App. at 147.  
Nevertheless, at the district court's colloquy to determine whether Charles was aware that 
he was "voluntarily and knowingly" waiving his right to counsel, Charles repeatedly 
indicated that he was afraid that the Government of the Virgin Islands, the citizens of 
the Virgin Islands, and his defense attorney were conspiring against him.4  His paranoid 
                     
4
 For example, when the district court asked Charles whether he understood that if he 
agreed to the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity on stipulated facts, the court 
might find him not guilty by reason of mental illness and commit him for evaluation with 
the possibility of a return to society, Charles responded: 
 
 Your honor, the whole thing with all of them, right, they afraid 
of me for what they have done to me . . . The whole thing about the 
government, the prosecutor, they all -- not the prosecutor, really, 
they haven't physically done me anything -- but the government, of 
itself, is afraid of me.   
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behavior at this critical juncture revealed that he is an individual who remains prone to 
periods of incoherent, delusional thought.  It is true, as Judge Stapleton points out, 
that at times Charles was lucid and coherent in his responses to the district court's 
questions.  However,  his delusional statements demonstrate that his seemingly coherent 
responses to the court's questions were hardly indicative of his overall mental capacity. 
Certainly, at the very least, his delusional tendencies exposed the sad fact that he was 
utterly incompetent to effectively conduct his own defense. 
 I cannot agree that merely because a defendant is competent to waive counsel, 
fortiori, he or she is also competent to act as counsel and to try the case, for it seems 
obvious to me that a prerequisite to a determination of competence to waive counsel is a 
searching evaluation of the degree to which one actually is capable of and competent to 
try one's case.  The Supreme Court in Godinez suggests that a knowing and intelligent 
waiver ends the inquiry, as if everything else that follows is logical, rational, 
reasonable and presumed.  I think, again, that whether a person is, in fact, competent to 
waive counsel depends in part upon whether he or she is competent to represent him or 
herself, and that these are two distinct issues which must be separately evaluated.  The 
latter is obviously relevant to the former, and there are any number of issues unique to 
different types of cases which prove this point. 
 Let's assume, for example, that Charles was charged with a series of intricate 
and complex tax fraud counts which had taken three years to investigate, had involved
hundred thousand pages of documents, and had required the appointment of a special 
                                                                                          
 
App. at 246.   
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prosecutor with considerable expertise in this area. Under the Godinez Court's reasoning, 
all of this is "not relevant" to whether Charles was competent to waive counsel.  In other 
words, it doesn't matter that Charles obviously is not competent to actually represent 
himself; the only question is whether he is lucid enough to make it through a colloquy and 
to waive his right to counsel.  So long as he is, according to the Court, he is ready and 
able to try his case.  There is no need to look any deeper because, after all, during the 
colloquy Charles was able to punctuate his random incoherences with a few moments of 
apparent lucidity and to answer the right questions satisfactorily.  This, according to 
the Court, automatically renders him fit to try his murder case and, presumably, would 
have rendered him fit to try the hypothetical tax fraud case, too.  The end result is 
almost always preordained.  It is hardly surprising, then, that Charles and many others 
similarly situated -- some of whom might have reasonable insanity defenses or other 
avenues of defense to pursue -- usually wind up either on death row or serving life 
sentences. 
 In cases such as these, I believe that the trial judge should be required to go 
further; to conduct another competency evaluation to determine a defendant's capacity to 
represent him or herself, including weighing various characteristics unique both to the 
defendant and to the case.  A defendant who waives his or her Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel should not be left naked and unprotected by the Constitution.  The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is supposed to prevent the government from obtaining a 
criminal conviction through a procedure that fails to meet the standards of due process of 
law. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[u]nless a defendant charged with a serious 
offense has counsel able to invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards that 
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distinguish our system of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself. 
When a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it is the State that 
unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty."  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 
396 (1985), quoting, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980).  The fact that a 
defendant acts as his or her own counsel does not alter the nature of his or her due 
process rights. 
 But it would appear that the Court in Godinez ignored the fundamental due 
process protections afforded to a defendant at trial, regardless of whether he or she has 
waived his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  After Godinez, defendants like 
Charles, who have knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to counsel, are left alone 
in their efforts to defend themselves, regardless of their competency to do so.  
Nevertheless, because I am bound to follow Godinez, I must vote with the majority.  The 
district court determined that Charles was competent to stand trial and that he knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.  The district court was in a better position 
to evaluate Charles' mental state and to discern whether Charles understood the 
implications of presenting his own defense.  The court conducted its colloquy in 
accordance with the requirements of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and found 
that Charles met the Godinez standard for competence.  There is simply not enough in the 
record to disturb this finding. 
 This case highlights the immense responsibility placed upon a district court 
conducting a Faretta hearing.  In Government of the Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 
471-73 (3d Cir. 1991), we determined that a court conducting a Faretta hearing must "make 
a thorough and penetrating inquiry to determine whether the defendant understands the 
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nature of the charges, the range of possible punishment, potential defenses, technical 
problems that the defendant may encounter, and any other facts important to a general 
understanding of the risks involved."  Given that the Supreme Court has determined that a 
defendant's competency to conduct his or her own defense is not relevant to whether a 
defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel, district 
courts ought to be particularly vigilant in assuring that a defendant understands exactly 
what he or she is waiving in a Faretta hearing.  The Faretta hearing, in this case and in 
many future cases, was and will be the last procedural safeguard available to a mentally 
unstable but "competent" defendant who mistakenly believes he or she can effectively try 
his or her own case. 
 The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded 
the right to the assistance of counsel before he or she can be validly convicted and 
punished by imprisonment.  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).  Through its holdings 
in Faretta and Godinez, the Court has defined this right in such a way that requires us to 
allow a paranoid, delusional defendant to elect to represent himself at trial, pursue an 
ill-advised defense, and ultimately be sentenced to life imprisonment.  That this result 
is constitutionally permissible is deeply disturbing and ultimately "impugns the integrity 
of our criminal justice system."  Godinez, 125 L.Ed.2d at 344 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
